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This article provides insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to 
define what would be the best strategy for Europe. To preserve financial stability, Europe has 
to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. 
Among the five scenarios we defined, three achieve financial stability both inside and outside 
Europe.  In  terms  of  market  efficiency,  the  multi-polar  scenario  is  the  best  and  the 
fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new 
capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the 
multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which 
implies  moving  further  away  from  respective  national  preferences.  However,  the  more 
realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: (i) this level of coordination seems 
much more realistic than the global one; (ii) the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy 
substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually 
increase  the  degree  of  financial  integration  outside  Europe  in  line  with  the  degree  of 
cooperation with the rest of the world. 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, which is not over yet, has shown that finance matters a lot and 
exerts a powerful influence on the world economy. The increasing importance of finance, 
both private and public finance, is particularly true in Europe. Finance plays an essential role 
for the (mis)allocation of capital among sectors and countries. It is also a major factor of 
instability, both for the financial and the real sectors of the economy, at all levels: national, 
regional and international. 
A priori, it seems difficult to forecast what will be the evolution of financial markets in the 
coming  decades,  not  least  because  finance  is  fundamentally  unstable!  Nevertheless,  it  is 
crucial to define what could be the future of finance due to its central importance for the 
world and European economies. 
Forecasting the evolution of finance is needed for regulation purposes: there is a need to adapt 
the rules to the transformation of financial markets in the future. This study is an attempt to 
analyze the wide array of possibilities in the future, as they range: (i) from a reform based on 
micro-prudential regulation to a strong state-controlled macro-prudential regulation; (ii) from 
regulation at  a national  level to regulation at a global level;  and (iii) from strong capital 
controls between economic areas to strong financial integration. 
The methodology of this study will consist in building contrasted scenarios in order to allow 
for strategic thinking about the evolution of finance up to 2030. The scenarios will be built 
around  the  strategies  of  the  major  actors,  public  and  private,  of  the  world  economy  and 
financial  markets,  including  the  interrelated  role  of  financial  regulation  and  financial 
innovation. This study will also focus on the role of Europe as concerns financial markets and 
the impact of finance on Europe in 2030.  
The  study  is  composed  of  three  sections.  The  first  section  provides  a  description  of  the 
spontaneous trends of financial markets, with a focus on major players. Section 2 builds on 
the evolution of financial system depending on the different types of regulations implemented 
in the future decades. Finally, section 3 provides a panorama of five alternative scenarios 
based  on  different  assumptions  as  to  the  strategies  and  the  role  of  major  players.  These 
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I-The spontaneous tendency of financial markets 
In this part, we define the spontaneous tendency of finance in order to pinpoint what could be 
the future strategies of operators, the future locations of financial centres, the most promising 
markets, and the new major players. 
Future strategies of financial operators 
The financial operators’ view is determinant in shaping future finance, since they will take 
strategic  decisions  inside  banks  and  financial  institutions.  According  to  European  bank 
managers  and  financial  executives
3, the main challenges are (i) the improvement of risk 
management, (ii) the adaptation to changing regulation, (iii) the intensification of price 
competition,  (iv)  the  concentration  of  financial  markets,  and  (v)  the  standardization  of 
financial operations to facilitate automation, replacing workers with machines. Thus, financial 
institutions will try to increase their size and to reduce costs of financial transactions to  deal 
with stronger competition in more globalised financial markets. Furthermore, while financial 
operators  seem  to  have  realized  at  least  partially  the  shortcomings  of  their  own  risk 
management in the past, they worry now more about new regulatory constraints. To put it in a 
different way, they would prefer to deal with financial instability at the firm level  rather than 
be closely controlled by state supervisors and regulatory authorities. 
Future locations of financial centres 
The future locations of financial centres will probably be rebalanced with the emergence of 
deeper markets in the emerging market economies. First, the development of Islamic finance 
could help centres to thrive in the Middle East and in Asia
4. Secondly, if commodities became 
major safe havens for investors, some new  centres in emerging countries  – which produce 
them – could play a growing role
5. Thirdly, the opening of financial markets in the emerging 
countries would  undoubtedly change the situation   greatly. For example, in 2010 Ch ina 
decided to make the Renminbi convertible for non-residents, paving the way for Honk Kong 
to become the most important financial centre in Asia. 
                                                 
3 For more details, see Engstler and Welsch (2008), KPMG, (2008), and Ernst & Young, (2009). 
4 According to  International Financial Services London (2010), the countries which could benefit from the 
development of Islamic finance are: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain. 
5 The BM&F Bovespa (Sao Paolo) or the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange (Mumbai), which 
grew rapidly in the last years, may have a stronger role in the future. We can also mention the brand new Dubai 
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Promising markets 
It  is  rather difficult  to  identify promising markets  for the next  20  years.  There are some 
emerging new markets such as ethical and green finance which could be destined to play an 
important role in the future, but it is too early to assess their future importance. This depends 
crucially on future innovations, which are closely linked to regulation. According to both 
specialists and practitioners, the strategic markets should be derivatives. Otherwise, over-the-
counter  markets  could  grow  fast  to  avoid  organized  markets  which  could  be  much  more 
regulated in the future. But this evolution may be stopped by new regulation, under study 
today, about the obligation of all actors on OTC to register with clearinghouses. 
Players 
The major players of financial markets will be both public and private entities. In the first 
place, the growth in the number of sovereign wealth funds
6, which prefer riskier investments, 
could increase the exposure of  government-controlled investments.  Whereas  central bank 
purchases of safe assets reduced the global interest rate in the 2000s, the growth of risky 
investments made by sovereign funds may lead to an increase in asset prices. On At the same 
time, private actors such as hedge funds and private equity are called upon to play an 
increasing role. It is difficult to define what would be their activities in the future , because 
those depend on the regulatory reforms that will be put in place. Nevertheless, speculative 
activities of hedge funds imply important systemic risks and may create contagion effects in 
the  banking  system.  Public  actors  –  regulators,  states,  central  banks,  and  international 
organizations – are also bound to play an important role if the instability of financial markets 
is  to  be persistent.  It  may  be that in  some  emerging  countries  – such  as  China  – public 
authorities will play a dominant role, while the influence of private players is more important 
in countries where the market economy is more developed, as is the case in the US and in 
Europe. At the international  level,  civil  society (meaning non-governmental organizations  
defending  the  general  interest)  is  also  bound  to  play  an  increasing  role.  International 
organizations, such as the IMF, may also have a growing influence, depending on the nature 
of the likely reforms of the international monetary system. 
 
                                                 
6 Most of the sovereign wealth funds are in China, Russia and the OPEC countries which are major exporters of, 
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Financial innovation vs. regulation 
The development of financial innovation has been motivated for a long time by the desire to 
avoid taxes or government regulation. We can therefore expect that new regulatory constraints 
will  be  circumvented  by  financial  innovations  to  come.  We  can  distinguish  two  ways  of 
avoiding regulatory constraints. On the one hand, financial operators can escape regulators by 
transferring their capital to offshore financial centres with a high degree of financial secrecy. 
On the other hand, institutions can create some new financial products and develop a “shadow 
banking system” or a “shadow financial market” in order to steer clear of regulation and 
supervision. 
II-Tools to regulate financial markets 
The two dimensions of financial regulation: micro- and macro-prudential regulations 
The role of prudential regulation is to prevent bank failures and financial crises. The reason 
for preventing financial crises is that the costs to society are more important than crises in 
other  sectors  and  exceed  the  private  cost  to  individual  financial  institutions.  Prudential 
regulation  aims  at  internalizing  these  externalities  in  the  behaviour  of  such  institutions. 
Prudential  regulation  has  two  dimensions:  micro-prudential  and  macro-prudential.  Micro-
prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of individual entities and the protection 
of clients of these institutions. Macro-prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of 
the financial system as a whole. Micro-prudential regulation consists of such measures as (i) 
the certification of those working in the financial sector; (ii) rules on what assets can be held 
by whom; (iii) how instruments are listed, traded, sold and reported; (iv) measures of the 
value and riskiness of assets. The Basel Committee on bank supervision has played a major 
role in defining the rules and instruments of micro-prudential regulation. One of the main 
tools put forward by the Basel Committee is that of capital adequacy requirements.   
Until recently, the Basel approach rested on the principle that the purpose of regulation is to 
ensure the soundness of individual institutions against the risk of loss on their assets. The 
Basel  Committee  doctrine  was  based  on  the  false  assumption  that  actions  enhancing  the 
soundness of a particular institution should also promote overall stability. However, ensuring 
the safety of each individual institution is not a sufficient condition for the soundness of the 
system as a whole. It is possible, indeed often likely, that attempts by individual institutions to 
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transferring  risky  toxic  assets  to  other  financial  unregulated  financial  institutions  such  as 
hedge funds. One of the major causes of the crisis has been the deficit of macro-prudential 
regulation. 
Micro-prudential regulation examines the responses of an individual bank to exogenous risks. 
By definition, it does not incorporate endogenous risk. It also ignores the systemic importance 
of individual institutions as defined by their size, the degree of leverage they use, and their 
interconnectedness with the rest of the system. This is why we need to complement micro-
prudential  regulation  with  macro-prudential  regulation.  The  macro-prudential  approach  to 
regulation considers the systemic implications of the collective behaviour of banks.  
A  critical  feature  of  macro-prudence  and  systemic  stability  is  the  heterogeneity  of  the 
financial system. Homogeneity – everyone selling or buying at the same time – undermines 
the system.  Invariably, market participants start off being heterogeneous but a number of 
factors – such as the use of similar techniques of risk measurement by banks – drive them to 
homogeneity. In this regard systemic risk is endogenous, and macro-prudential regulation is 
about identifying those endogenous processes that turn heterogeneity into homogeneity. 
There  is  a  growing  consensus  that  the  most  important  manifestation  of  market  failure  in 
banking  and  financial  markets  is  pro-cyclicality.  According  to  this  view,  the  purpose  of 
macro-regulation is to act as countervailing force to the pro-cyclical behaviour of banks which 
is based on their underestimation of risks in a boom and their overestimation of risks in the 
subsequent collapse. This shift in risk perception from “too low” to “too high” is an essential 
problem.  The  purpose  of  macro-prudential  regulation  is  to  moderate  financial  cycles  by 
narrowing this gap in forcing banks to improve their measurement of risks in boom and bust. 
A critical part of micro-prudential regulation in the last decade was the increasing use of 
market prices in valuation and risk assessment. This was done in the name of transparency, 
risk-sensitivity  and  prudence,  but  what  it  achieved  was  increasing  homogeneity  and 
cyclicality  of  market  behaviour,  hence  also  increased  systemic  fragility.  Micro-prudential 
behaviour can thus endogenously create macro-prudential risks. 
Counter-cyclical  bank  regulation  can  be  introduced  through  banks’  dynamic  provisions 
systems, linking provisioning to the credit cycle.  This technique has already been used in 
Spain and Portugal. Such a system requires higher provisions when credit grows more than 
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cyclical  bank  regulation  is  via  capital  requirements.  Basel  III  guidelines  presented  in 
September 2010 propose making bank capital charges counter-cyclical. 
Micro  and  macro-prudential  regulation  differ  in  their  needed  professionalism.  Micro-
prudential  regulation  should  be  carried  out  by  banking  and  financial  market  supervisors, 
whereas macro-prudential regulation should be put under the responsibility of central banks. 
Central banks should have to monitor credit expansion which is a major channel of bubbles 
and financial  crises.  Such instruments as  loan-to-value ratios  and progressive compulsory 
reserves on bank credit may be used by central banks to reduce credit cycles. 
Not all banks are alike. Regulation should acknowledge that some banks are systemically 
important. Tighter supervision of the latter banks needs to be implemented. By the same 
token, international cooperation is required for the regulation and supervision of banks which 
operate in several countries. 
In short, the subprime crisis has shown that the existing framework of banking regulation was 
insufficiently macro-prudential. A reform of financial and banking regulation is under way to 
introduce  new  instruments,  and  to  achieve  a  new  balance  between  micro-  and  macro-
prudential  regulations.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  new  Basel  III  guidelines  presented  in 
September 2010 or the reforms implemented in 2011 in the European Union along the lines 
proposed by the Larosière Report. 
Financial regulation at the international level 
At the international level, the regulator has three main objectives which are not necessarily 
compatible:  (i)  financial  stability,  (ii)  independence  of  regulatory  policy,  (iii)  financial 
integration. 
Financial stability seems to be the most obvious target. Since the last crisis a fairly clear 
consensus has emerged among the G20 central bankers (Banque de France, 2011). They agree 
on the need for enhanced supervision of the financial sector – especially for systemically 
important financial institution (SIFI) – and greater coordination of national policies in order to 
ensure financial stability internationally. One can note two interesting nuances among central 
bankers of emerging countries. They expect a change in the International Monetary System 
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speculative capital flows, by nature more volatile, since those have a particularly destabilizing 
effect on emerging markets. 
The independence of regulatory policy may appear desirable, because it allows each country 
to regulate its financial market according to national preferences. For example, following the 
example of Germany, other countries might wish to ban short sales or opt for more stringent 
prudential standards for systemically important actors (e.g. hedge funds). Indeed, preferences 
in the regulation of financial markets are quite heterogeneous in the world. On one side, 
Europeans seem willing to put in place a regulatory regime based on a strong coercive power 
of the authorities. On the other side, the United States appear more directed towards a system 
focused on market-based insurance mechanisms (Goodhart, 2010). 
For many  years much of the economic literature has been arguing in favour of a greater 
degree of financial integration which is defined as better access to foreign capital markets for 
investors. Financial integration is supposed to have several advantages. Firstly, it enables a 
more  efficient  capital  allocation,  because  savers  benefit  from  a  wider  choice  in  their 
investment decisions and potentially have access to more lucrative investments. Secondly, the 
deregulation of national markets allows investors to diversify the risk of their portfolios more 
effectively by holding assets that are less correlated due to the fact that they are issued in 
countries with different economic characteristics. 
The second point, however, raises two questions. The first question concerns the impact of 
globalization  on  national  circumstances.  In  recent  decades  traditional  barriers  to  trade  in 
goods and services and to capital flows have eroded and economies have become increasingly 
interdependent. When a shock occurs, it is felt throughout the system via fewer commercial 
opportunities,  lower  investment  incomes,  and  devaluations  of  foreign  assets.  The  second 
question  is  that  of  the  consequences  of  greater  financial  integration  on  the  resilience  of 
financial markets. Indeed, there are good grounds for considering that breaking down barriers 
between national financial markets increases the global systemic risk. Thus, the reduction of 
portfolio risk expected from the international diversification is not so obvious, since financial 
integration would cause an increase in the risk to which all assets are exposed. Thus, the 
deepening  of  financial  integration  is  beneficial  only  if  systemic  risk  is  reduced  by  an 
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To sum up, the efficiency of micro-prudential and macro-prudential measures depends on the 
capacity to control international financial markets. We can identify three main objectives of 
regulation at the international level. First, authorities try to reach a high degree of financial 
integration to allow a better allocation of capital and to permit a better diversification of risks. 
Second,  governments  want  to  improve  financial  stability,  including  the  need  to  avoid 
international arbitrage between financial centres and their regulations (e.g. tax havens). Third, 
decision makers wish to maintain the independence of the national regulatory system in order 
to decide how financial activities should be regulated (e.g. limitations on short selling). These 
three objectives cannot be combined. 
Figure 1. The incompatibility triangle of financial objectives 
 
Note: in this figure, we indicated the scenarios described in the third part. 
The trilemma in financial regulation at the international level can be represented by a triangle 
with one of the objectives at each vertex. The regulator has to leave aside one of them. As 
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integration or accept to reinforce international governance
7. Thus, it is necessary to adapt the 
scale of international regulation to the scale of risk caused by greater financial integration at 
the global level. 
In the context of open capital markets, it is impossible  for a single nation-state to define an 
effective regulation of finance. Financial institutions will seek the least restrictive supervision 
system so as to avoid compliance with the standards set by the regulator
8. Thus, even the most 
powerful prudential arsenal at the national level will be rendered inefficient by the opening-up 
of financial markets which permits investors to direct capital flows to the less  regulated 
financial centres. G20 measures targeting tax havens seem inadequate. The list provided b y 
the OECD is based primarily on criteria of transparency and exchange of information that are 




After describing the spontaneous tendencies of finance and the tools available to regulate it, 
we will now discuss the effect of different regulatory policies on the natural evolution of 
markets. The issue is to describe the impact they could have on the world, according to the 
configuration chosen, and to determine what would be the best strategy for Europe. To do 
this, we define five scenarios
10 that are distinguished by the leading actors who have the 
power  to  impose  their  strategies  to  the  world.  Alternatively ,  we  define  five  groups 
distinguished  by  decision  makers:  Chimerica  (United  States  and  China),  multinational 
corporations, nation-states, regional blocs, and supranational authorities. 
Chimerica: United States-China 
In this scenario, current trends continue, assuming that on the economic and financial levels 
the United States and China are in a position to impose their decisions, since none of the 
major players opposes them. On the one hand, the United States pursues a domestic demand-
led growth strategy. The Fed conducts an accommodative monetary policy, and fiscal policy 
                                                 
7 See Aglietta (2011). 
8 For further details about the inadequacy between international financial markets and institutions, and national 
supervision and crisis management, see (Goodhart and Lastra, 2010). 
9 See on this point, the protest of Josef Pröll, the Austrian  Minister of Finance (Vanessa Houlder, « Ports in a 
storm », Financial Times, November 17, 2009. 
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is  occasionally used to  cover shortfalls  in  demand. On the other hand, China favours  an 
export-led growth and continues to accumulate foreign exchange reserves – in dollars and, 
increasingly, in other currencies – to perform a slow and gradual revaluation of the Renminbi. 
In this way, the price competitiveness of China is maintained and the transition to domestic 
demand-led growth takes place smoothly. 
In this context, commodity export revenues will continue to grow. Sovereign wealth funds in 
commodity-exporting  countries  acquire  an  increasing  amount  of  assets  in  developed 
countries,  and  very  soon  a  steady  income  replaces  commodity  revenues.  China  and 
commodity-producing countries, which hold a large share of their assets in U.S. currency, 
maintain their peg to the US dollar which remains the international reference currency. 
Europe and the rest of the world are subjected to the growth strategies of other actors. The 
euro appreciates, because the U.S. and Chinese growth strategies cause a sharp increase in the 
supply of dollar assets relative to other currencies. European growth is slowed by the rise of 
prices expressed in euros. As debt sustainability depends on interest rates and on the growth 
rates of the GNP, GIIPS
11 should find more and more difficult to meet interest payments. The 
euro area experiences increasingly strong tensions. Germany pursues its strategy of wage 
moderation, while the relative unit labour cost continues to grow in GIIPS (except  in Spain 
and Ireland where it has been decreasing since 2008
12). Since the Eurozone becomes weaker, 
the European influence on the global economy decreases rapidly. Moreover, as China and 
commodity-exporting countries diversify their exchange reserves in favour of Euros, Europe 
should pay increasingly high interests to these countries, which reduces GNP. 
Consolidation: multinational corporations (minimum state) 
We  continue  another  important  trend  in  recent  decades:  the  declining  power  of  states, 
matched at the same time by the growing influence of multinational corporations. We assume 
that  large  firms  are  becoming  increasingly  powerful.  Thus,  they  can  take  advantage  of 
competition  between  states  that  seek  to  become  more  attractive,  particularly  in  terms  of 
taxation, regulation, or confidentiality. Thus, multinationals have power to bypass regulation 
and supervision that governments try to establish. Investors will flock to financial markets 
                                                 
11 Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
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with  soft  regulation  at  the  expense  of  those  trying  to  impose  measures  that  reduce  the 
competitiveness of firms, but are essential to the establishment of financial stability. 
Financial institutions are given free rein to develop their business globally. Financial industry 
becomes more concentrated, because players seek to reach the minimum size needed to be 
internationally competitive. Meanwhile, stock exchange markets continue to merge. After the 
creation of Euronext
13 in 2000 and its merger with the New York Stock Exchange to create the 
NYSE Euronext group, a new merger could take place with Deutsche Börse. Thus, if the 
integration process taking place today in Europe and North America continues, it could well 
lead to the creation of a single global financial market that would improve liquidity. 
Governments tend to establish the least stringent regulatory standards possible – what is often 
termed  the  “race  to  the  bottom”  –  and  prefer  self-regulation  to  attract  large  financial 
institutions that generate higher incomes. Within this oligopolistic global financial market, the 
trend  towards  automation  of  financial  transactions  continues  without  being  too  heavily 
constrained by regulators. The development of high-frequency trading generates an increase 
in gross trading volume, while net trading volume stagnates. We observe recurrent financial 
panics which can result from decisions of large operators and from the spread of automated 
trade execution
14. Finally, the reinforcement of global financial integration increases systemic 
risk, but there is no supranational authority to regulate this supranational market. 
The few measures that have been taken to improve macro -prudential regulation are  rapidly 
circumvented, because governments feel the need to woo financial institutions which make 
high profits. At the same time, the concentration of finance implies an increase in the number 
of  systemically  important  financial  institutions  (SIFI)  and  hence  aggravates  financial 
instability. In such a context, it is likely  that financial crises and stock -market panics will 
become more frequent. This scenario could also lead to the fragmentation of the eurozone, 
which would result from a sudden stop in capital inflows to GIIPS. 
 
                                                 
13 The group was founded in 2000 with originally Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Brussels Stock Exchange and 
Paris Bourse. Then, LIFFE joined them in 2001 and the Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto (BVLP) in 2002. 
14 The stock market crash of 6 May 2010 provides an interesting example of such a financial panic. On this day, 
the main US financial indexes fell by 10% within 15 minutes, before returning to their previous level. For further 
information on the role played by automated trading strategies, see the report of the CFTC and SEC (2010) on 
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Fragmentation: Nation-state (economic nationalism) 
The negative effects of globalization experienced by workers create a feeling of economic 
patriotism. Most economies in Europe and elsewhere prefer to adopt purely national economic 
governance  and  strictly  control  international  capital  flows.  The  globalized  financial  and 
economic space is divided to correspond to the social and political space. Fragmentation is a 
major concern of the private sector which fears a return to a strong state. Ernst & Young 
(2009) notes, moreover, a buzz on the word « protectionism » at the 2009 Davos Conference 
and that the fight against it is a priority for most decision makers.  
The financial markets are becoming more localized, and the regulation is country-specific. In 
some  countries,  the  banking  system  may  even  be  nationalized  to  closely  regulate  market 
activities. The retreat into protectionism also involves the establishment of exchange controls 
and the setting up of currency-undervaluation strategies which may further destabilize the 
foreign exchange market. In such a context, there exist major arbitrage opportunities for those 
with the ability to execute trades across borders. 
The euro-zone is fragmented, and each member-state returns to its previous national currency. 
This scenario is far from being impossible, if one looks at the nicknames used to refer to the 
indebted economies. The group of countries consisting of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain are often referred as PIIGS, GIPSI or “club med” by the economic press, in academia,  
and among bond analysts. These quite offensive nicknames stigmatize the lack of seriousness 
of indebted countries and reflect a deep resentment among North European countries against 
their Southern neighbors. 
The abandonment of the euro would have serious consequences on Europe. The intra-EU 
trade would be reduced because of the instability of prices in foreign European currencies and 
increase in transaction costs. European currencies become vulnerable again to speculative 
attacks and to currency crisis. The borrowing costs rise in South European countries, whereas 
German growth substantially slows down because of the appreciation of the Deutsche mark 
which becomes the main safe haven for investors. Finally, neither the North nor the South 
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Regionalisation: Regional integration 
In this case, the negative effects of financial globalization generate a different reaction of the 
national states: instead of reducing the economic space at the national level, they decide to 
create  regional  economic  spaces.  At  the  same  time,  political  power  is  organized  at  the 
regional scale to meet the size of the economic space. Regional-states put in place a common 
financial  regulation  at  the  bloc  level.  We  can  also  imagine  the  emergence  of  regional 
initiatives to counterbalance the power of governments and the influence of firms. Thus, a 
group of European  elected officials  launched  a call
15 to  “organize the creation of  a non-
governmental organization capable of developing a counter-expertise on activities carried out 
on financial markets by the major operators”. The goal of the “finance watch” project is to 
compete  with  the  private  lobbies  which  contributed  to  the  engagement  in  riskier  lending 
activities (Igan et al., 2009). 
In  this  scenario  financial  regulation  is  region-specific.  The  regional  governments  control 
capital flows to avoid regulatory arbitrage between regions. The blocs can be constituted on 
the basis of existing agreements. Beside the European Union, we could imagine that NAFTA, 
ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the CIS or the Arab League would move towards a stronger financial 
integration. The fragmentation of financial markets requires the financial institutions to adopt 
a different strategy in each bloc in order to adapt to region-specific characteristics. 
The  eurozone  enlarges  to  increase  its  weight  in  the  world  economy  and  the  size  of  its 
domestic market. In fact, the wider the financial integration area and the more unified the 
regulation system are, the better the capital allocation and the diversification of portfolio risk 
will be. The full range of economic policy is put in place at the European level, beyond just 
monetary or fiscal policy. Europe benefits from advantages of financial integration at the 
continental level and can establish a financial regulation compatible with its systemic risk 
aversion,  perhaps  even  creating  a  currency  transaction  tax.  Afterwards,  the  “European 
government” might increase financial integration with the rest of the world in line with the 
degree of cooperation of regional blocs on prudential supervision and mutual surveillance of 
their banking systems. 
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Multi-polar: global integration and supranational regulation 
The  multi-polar  scenario  implies  both  a  strong  intervention  capacity  of  governments  and 
massive  participation  of  civil  society  in  the  functioning  of  financial  markets.  First, 
governments of major world economies reach an agreement (e.g. at the level of G20, or an 
enlarged G20) on financial regulation and create the necessary institutions to enforce these 
common rules. Thus, political power is established at the scale of financial globalization with 
suitable  supranational  institutions  capable  of  addressing  the  need  for  proactive  global 
systemic risk management. Indeed, the cooperation of governments on a sufficiently binding 
regulation and the capability of supranational institutions to prevent the creation of offshore 
financial  centres  –  as  well  as  to  limit  other  shadow  transactions  –  are  prerequisites  for 
stabilizing financial markets. 
Second,  this  scenario  necessitates  the  emergence  of  a  counterbalancing  force  besides 
governments’ and multinational corporations’ powers. If there is already a world social forum 
for civil society – which is the answer to Davos’ World economic forum for corporations and 
to G20 summits for governments – this third force is not yet sufficiently organized to respond 
to the challenges of globalization, especially at the financial level. 
There are, however, some interesting citizens’ initiatives aimed at rebalancing globalization. 
On the one hand, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) claim that “the interaction among the Fed’s 
monetary stance, global real interest rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation 
created the toxic mix of conditions making the U.S. the epicentre of the global financial 
crisis.” Thus, it seems more than necessary to create a civil society organization – i.e. the 
equivalent of the European “Finance Watch” at the global scale – that would keep an eye on 
financial authorities and institutions in order to avoid the repetition of such a disaster. 
On  the  other  hand,  civil  society  could  also  put  in  place  payment  systems  in  addition  to 
traditional banking. Lietaer (2008) argues that the development of local monies would deal 
with the problem of crises in increasing the resilience of the economic system, even if it 
would reduce the efficiency of the monetary system. Therefore, the question of monetary 
creation  is  sensitive,  since  the  excess  of  liquidity  –  which  means  a  creation  of  liquidity 
beyond the credit absorption capacity of the US economy – contributed to the subprime crisis. 
Ethical finance is an interesting alternative for investors wishing to devote their savings to 
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labour code, and  refrain from speculative activities. The development of such finance could 
have stabilizing effects on markets.  
To summarize, in this scenario we assume a combined success of governments and civil 
society  to  rebalance  the  financial  globalization  process.  On  the  government  side,  success 
implies  renouncing  national  preferences.  Nation-states  must  adopt  a  similar  regime  of 
financial regulation with common rules in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage. This means the 
end of tax havens that would render ineffective the attempts to regulate at the global level. On 
the  civil-society  side,  counterbalancing  powers  must  be  created  to  oppose  the  lobbies  of 
financial  institutions  and  to  watch  the  developments  of  financial  markets.  Under  these 
conditions  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world  could  fully  enjoy  the  benefits  of  financial 
globalization, yielding a more efficient allocation of capital and better distribution of risk. 
Conclusions 
The  aim  of  this  article  was  to  provide  insight  into  the  future  of  financial  markets  and 
regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe. The main objectives 
of financial regulators should be stability and market efficiency. However, favourite methods 
to  achieve  stability  can  be  rather  different  from  country  to  country  and  may  depend  on 
national preferences or institutional tradition. 
We  have  shown  that  it  was  difficult  to  combine  financial  stability  with  both  financial 
integration and sovereign financial regulation. This implies that Europe has to choose between 
financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance. The options are 
summed up in Table 2. Three of the five scenarios achieve financial stability both inside and 
outside Europe. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the 
fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new 
capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the 
multi-polar scenario is the worst because it necessitates coordination at the global level which 
implies moving further away from respective national preferences. 
Finally, even if the multi-polar scenario is the first best solution, the more realistic option 
seems to be the regionalisation scenario. On the one hand, the regional level of coordination 
seems much more realistic than the global one, since the preferences are much more similar 
on that scale. On the other hand, it should be of sufficient size in order to enjoy substantial 
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gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of 
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Table 1. Presentation of the five scenarios 
 
 
  Bipolar  Consolidation  Fragmentation  Regionalisation  Multipolar 
Decision 
makers 
USA-China                 
(Europe?) 
Big companies               
(minimum state) 
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Basel III  Emphasis on microprudential 


















regulation and supervision. 
Credit rating agencies are 
more supervised but they are 
still paid by the issuers 
(conflict of interest). 
Macroprudential regulation is 
circumvented by financial 
innovations 
Country-specific  Region-specific 
Supranational institution in 
charge of macroprudential 
regulation. Credit rating 
agencies are closely 
supervised and they are paid 















Minimum reform to improve 
the transparency of tax havens 
The transparency is 
insufficient and international 
regulatory arbitrage continues 
No coordination of regulation 
systems. Strong heterogeneity 
of national preferences in 
terms of financial regulation 
(e.g. tax on financial 
transactions, limitations on 
short sellings) 
Coordination inside regional 
unions, but low coordination 
between blocs 







  IMS mostly based on dollar 
with a more and more 
important role for Yuan. Euro 
remains a second class 
currency. 
Domination of big banks and 
accommodation by central 
banks 
Three international moneys: 
dollar, euro and yuan. 
A world money for 
international transactions and 
reserves (SDR or Bancor) 
Regional monetary zone 
(Mercosur, euro area, 












































































Strong euro which adjust 
global imbalances. Growing 
tensions inside the euro area. 
Emergence of a world 
financial markets open 7/7 & 
24/24. Volatility of prices. 
Persistent financial instability, 




countries. Implosion of the 
euro area.Strong speculation 
on North European countries 
(Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands…) and higher 
cost of debt for GIIPS. 
Reduction of trade intra 
Europe. 
Development of a multipolar 
network of financial centers 
with some degree of 
specialization Enlargment of 
European Union to increase 
the size of the domestic 
economy. Strenthening of 
political Europe. Stronger 
economic and financial 
integration in Europe. 
Regional financial integration 
with differentiation of 
financial systems, Growing 
integration of European Union 
with the world economy. 
Reinforcement of the power 
of global institutions (G20, 
UN, IMF, WB, WTO…) 
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Bipolar  USA-China 
(Europe?)    +  −   +  +  −   + 
Consolidation  Big companies 




nationalism)  +  +  −   −   +  + 
Regionalisation  Regional unions  +  +  +  −   −   + 
Multipolar  Supranational 
institutions  +  +  +  +  −   −  
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